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Let me open this lecture – since it is devoted to the memory of Michael John Petry – 
with the following quotation from the well-known conference volume Hegel and 
Newtonianism: 
 
„At first sight, what we seem to have here [i.e. in the relation between Hegel and 
Newton] is little more than the contrast between the tested accomplishments of the 
founding father of modern science, and the random remarks of a confused and 
somewhat disgruntled philosopher; and if we are persuaded to concede that it may 
perhaps be something more than this – between the work of a clearsighted 
mathematician and experimentalist, and the blind assertions of some sort of Kantian 
logician, blundering about among the facts of the real world.“1 
 
These sentences have been written by Michael Petry twelve years ago, in 1992. 
They reflect a general attitude towards the relationship between Newton’s and 
Hegel’s work which Petry faced in the late 1960s; an attitude which he, however, tried 
to call into question in his own and in a joint international effort of research; an 
attitude which thereby became questionable among philosophers, but which still 
persists among scientists. Indeed, almost any scientist, more or less independent of 
his epistemological and philosophical concept, will still ask whether Hegel’s 
objections to Newton’s mechanics and optics – far from being justified – are the 
product of a post-scholastic approach at all. Even a physicist who has for some 
reason studied the original text of Newton’s Principia and who has thus realized that 
there do exist inconsistencies in the Newtonian concept of force, will still strongly 
doubt whether Hegel’s fundamental scepticism towards Newton’s concept of 
dynamical laws is justified. 
The persisting conception of Hegel’s criticism of Newton’s physics as an irrational or 
at least hopelessly exaggerated one partly has its roots mainly in Hegel’s terminology 
and in his style. This does not mean that a mere translation of Hegel’s arguments into 
any contemporary philosophical language be sufficient to immediately convince every 
Newtonian scientist. However, a non-Hegelian way of rephrasing the core of Hegel’s 
anti-Newtonian philosophy of nature can help to understand to which extent the latter 
does satisfy any scientist’s criteria for a rational and self-consistent theory. To de-
                                                 
1 M.J. Petry (ed.): Hegel and Newtonianism. Dordrecht & London 1993, Foreword, p. XI. 
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monstrate this is the central aim of my talk, which is structured as follows: In the first 
part, I’m trying to highlight basic features of Hegel’s criticism of Newton’s optics and 
celestial mechanics, eventually focussing on his concept of a “sense of nature”. This 
part has the character of a review. Second – and that is supposed to be the 
„reconsideration“ part of my paper – I’ll try to highlight the fundamental difference 
between Newton’s and Hegel’s ideas of natural laws and of the relation between 
mathematics and physics. Third, the metaphysical background of this difference will 
be analyzed. It is by the analysis of this metaphysical background that I hope to 
render Hegel’s criticism of Newton’s scientific revolution more understandable. 
 
 
I. Some basic features of Hegel’s criticism of Newton’s physics 
 
There is a wide range of topics on which Hegel disagrees with Newton, while there is 
only one subject which Newton has, according to Hegel, treated adequately from a 
philosophical point of view – namely the foundations of analysis.2 
It is well known that Newton’s way of unifying terrestrial and celestial mechanics, his 
method of investigating the nature of light and, last but not least, his allegedly empi-
ristic epistemology, have been critizised by Hegel in a very harsh way. Hegel’s 
criticism can be traced back to his earlierst writings,3 indicating that already the way 
in which Newtonian physics was tought in Tübingen in the 1790s gave Hegel the 
impression that Newton’s fame as founding father of modern physics be doubtful at 
best. Had Hegel been educated in England or France, then his attitude towards this 
question would have probably been somewhat different, since he would have had to 
perceive Newtonianism as a widely accepted and solid basis of scientific research, a 
basis which it became in Germany only some decades after Hegel’s death, when 
mathematical physics began to florish especially in Berlin. This does not imply, of 
course, that Hegel, if educated in England or in Germany around 1850, would not 
have critizised Newtonian physics at all. However, Hegel’s ambition to be not only a 
wiser philosopher, but also a smarter physicist than Newton would not have risen 
under other circumstances like the above indicated. 
In which respect did Hegel try to be a smarter physicist than Newton? For example, 
when he considers many of Newton’s optical experiments as moot4 or when he 
                                                 
2 Cf. R. Wahsner, „Der Gedanke kann nicht richtiger bestimmt werden, als Newton ihn gegeben hat.“ 
Das mathematisch Unendliche und der Newtonsche Bewegungsbegriff im Lichte des begriffslogischen 
Zusammenhangs von Quantität und Qualität. In: A. Arndt (ed.): Hegels Seinslogik – Interpretation und 
Perspektiven. Berlin (Akademie-Verlag) 2000, p. 271-300. 
3 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe II. Logik, Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie. Hrsg. von Rolf-
Peter Horstmann. Hamburg 1982  p. 217: „aber diese Materie ist nicht die Materie an sich, sondern 
auf ein ihr Fremdes äußerlich bezogen; und dies Verhältnis auf die Materie überhaupt übertragen, 
oder diese Materie für die absolute Nehmen ist eine von den Verwirrungen, die eine untergeordnete 
Seite zur absoluten macht.“ 
4 Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie Berlin 1821/22, Nachschrift von B.v.Uexküll, ed. G. Marmasse & 
Th. Posch, Frankfurt am Main 2002 (henceforth: Uexküll), p. 83: „Die Newtonschen Experimente sind 
zum Teil entsetzlich schlecht und ebenso schlecht die Schlüsse, welche daraus gezogen sind.“ 
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questions several aspects of Newton’s way of calculating planetary motions, this 
seems a bit overexaggerated even to the reader who is willing to take into account 
the possibility of errors both in the Principia and in the Opticks. To this claim I should 
add that I agree with the following statement by M. J. Petry: “If the natural science of 
the day is questioned, this is usually because Hegel thinks that it is overlooking 
qualitative differences. He never quarrels with it simply in order to make striking 
observations or indicate novel connections.”5 True, Hegel does not question New-
ton’s optical experiments or his calculations in celestial mechanics just “to make 
striking observations”. True, there is a metaphysical background even of these Hege-
lian critical remarks which seem to concern mere empirical questions (and I shall try 
to elucidate this background later in this talk rather extensively). Notwithstanding, we 
have to recognize that Hegel does attack Newton the physicist at some points, not 
only Newton the philosopher. In his lectures on the philosophy of nature, Hegel 
misses no occasion to stress that Newton erroneously claimed the impossibility of 
constructing a fully colour-corrected refracting telescope;6 that the Colour Wheel 
does in fact not look white when rotating;7 that it is unnecessary to completely darken 
the room when studying the sun’s spectrum using a prisma8 etc. etc. In all these 
cases, I think that Hegel overshoots the mark, running the risk of getting lost in 
details which do not contribute substantially to the respective main points of interest 
(such as the nature of gravitiy or the nature of light). 
It has to be admitted, though, that Hegel had a point here and there even when trying 
to be a smarter physicist than Newton. For example, Hegel found inconsistencies in 
Newton’s use of the concept of centrifugal force9 – inconsistencies which indepen-
dently led post-Newtonian physicists to the clarification or even to the refutation of 
this concept.10 
It must be taken into consideration furthermore that Hegel had a prominent example 
in his effort to outplay the physicist Newton: namely Goethe, who had done the same 
in his Farbenlehre and whom he repeatedly praises for his “great sense of nature”.11 
                                                 
5 Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, ed. and trans. by M.J. Petry, 3 vols., London and New York (George 
Allen and Unwin) 1970, Introduction, vol. 1, p. 30. 
6 E.g. Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie, Berlin 1825/26, unpublished manuscript by H.W. Dove, p. 56: 
„So sagt Newton, es seien keine Achromate möglich. Das große Gerüste der Anwendungen ist daher 
[!] selbst morsch in sich.“ 
7 Ibid., Ms. p. 57: „Newtons Schwungrad ergiebt grau, indem die Farben sind ein Helles u[nd] auch ein 
Dunkles“ 
8 E.g. Uexküll, Ms. p. 134 (ed. Marmasse/Posch p. 83): „Newton fängt von Prismen an (überflüssig, 
daß das Zimmer völlig verfinstert ist).“ 
9 W. Neuser, Introduction to: G.W.F. Hegel, Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum, Weinheim 
(Acta Humaniora VCH), 1986; M. Nasti de Vincentis, Hegel’s Worm in Newton’s Apple, in: Hegel and 
the Philosophy of Nature, ed. by St. Houlgate, New York (SUNY) 1998, p. 227sqq.; M.J. Petry: Hegel 
on Newton, Coulomb and Bode: the background to The Orbits of the Planets. In: W.Ch. Zimmerli, K. 
Stein & M. Gerten (eds.): „Fessellos durch die Systeme“. Frühromantisches Naturdenken im Umfeld 
von Arnim, Ritter und Schelling. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987 (frommann-holzboog) 1997, p. 391-457. 
10 Cf. M. Jammer, Copcepts of force, New York 1957. 
11 E.g. Uexküll, Ms p. 137: „Die dem Begriffe gemäße Ansicht der Farbe verdanken wir bekanntlich 
dem uns als Dichter und in jeder anderen Rücksicht ebenso werten Mann, dem Herrn von Goethe. 
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“Sense of nature” is a central expression in Hegel’s natural philosophy. Even though 
Hegel does certainly not reduce his method of natural philosophy to this “sense”, he 
seems to be of the opinion that it is a necessary opponent of understanding 
(Verstand) and especially of the Newtonian understanding. So we should try to clarify 
what this “sense of nature” is.  
It is supposed to be a method of contemplating nature which conserves natural 
phenomena as totalities instead of decomposing them into parts which are then 
made sort of atoms of the phenomena. This can be illustrated by the example of 
planetary motion as well as by the example of the spectrum of the sun. In the case of 
planetary motion, Hegel opposes its decomposition according to the parallelogram of 
forces, arguing that the concrete totality is thereby artificially dissected; it must be 
noted, though, that (as S. Alexander rightly observes) “Hegel does not deny the 
convenience of the distinction, but he accuses Newton of mistaking the directions into 
which the motion is resolved for real and actual forces, independent of each other.”12 
In the case of Newton’s theory of colour, Hegel argues similarly; he states that 
considering colours as the components or elements of light reverses the real order of 
the things, which is, according to him, that light is the primordial phenomenon and 
colours only emerge if light interacts with matter. 
Hence, sense of nature is conceived as a synthetic way of grasping the essence of 
phenomena; as a way of experience which does not introduce any distinctions of 
which it then forgets that they are extrinsic. It is debatable to which extent Hegel has 
worked out a definition of this method of experience and recognition. On any ac-
count, some stress must be laid upon the fact that the sense of nature which should 
grasp a phenomenon as a whole is not necessarily in opposition to mathematical 
recognition of nature; for we shall see later in the analysis of Hegel’s concept of 
natural laws that he greatly appreciates what he calls “laws of the phenomena” (as 
opposed to laws of forces). These so-called laws of the phenomena are charac-
terized by a consideration of natural phenomena in their totality, which does not 
exclude the derivation of mathematical relations between moments of these pheno-
mena such as space and time. 
 
 
II. Hegel’s view of the relation between physics and mathematics  
 
There is another motive in Hegel’s criticism of Newton’s physics which is even more 
fundamental than the epistemology of the “sense of nature”: namely the totally 
different way in which Newton and Hegel conceive the relationship between 
mathematics and physics. This difference reflects two entirely different methods of 
conceiving the essence of nature and the method of science. (Let us briefly consider 
the Newtonian way first.) 
                                                                                                                                                        
Dieser hat nach seinem großen Sinn die Farbe und das Licht herangezogen. Besonders von Seiten 
der Malerei hat dieser Gegenstand sein Interesse erweckt. Sein reiner, einfacher Natursinn, die erste 
Bedingung eines Dichters, mußte notwendig der Newtonschen Ansicht widerstreben.“ 
12 S. Alexander, Hegel’s Conception of Nature, Mind, vol. XI (1886), no. 44, p. 495-523. 
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IIa. Newton 
 
Newton made several paramount statements on his view of the relation between 
mathematics and physics (or „mechanics“ or „natural philosophy“) in quite prominent 
passages of his Principia. Already the first sentence of his Foreword refers to this 
problem. There can be no doubt that Hegel carefully studied this first sentence, and 
little – if any – doubt that it embarrassed him, given that it reads (I cite in Latin): 
 
„Cum veteres mechanicam [...] in rerum naturalium investigatione maximi fecerint; et 
recentiores, missis formis substantialibus et qualitatibus occultis, phaenomena 
naturae ad leges mathematicas revocare agressi sint: Visum est in hoc tractatu 
mathesim excolere, quatenus ea ad philosophiam spectat.“13 
 
I would suggest to rephrase this as follows: “Now that (since Bacon) the substantial 
forms (of the Aristotelians) have been abandoned from natural philosophy, mathe-
matics should replace them to the maximum possible extent.” Having in mind the 
development of physics in the second half of the 19th century, this might appear to us 
as a reasonable and well-defined programme; however, during Newton’s lifetime, it 
was not as well-defined, for it was still unclear: What means „mathematics“ in the 
context of science? Is it geometry, algebra, analysis, or the sum of all these 
disciplines? And – more importantly –: Can the mathematical description of nature – 
promising as it is – replace the Aristotelian ontological framework without introducing 
a new (even though maybe implicit and unwanted) ontology into the history of human 
thought? As for this question, Petry has rightly emphazised that Newton seems to 
have underestimated the „metaphysical“ content of his Principia.14   
Before commenting on this issue still further, let me quote another interesting state-
ment of Newton on the relation between mathematics and, as he puts it here, „philo-
sophy“. In the beginning of the third book of his Principia, he writes (– this time I 
quote from Motte’s translation into English): 
 
„In the preceding books I have laid down the principles of philosophy; principles not 
philosophical but mathematical: such, namely, as we may build our reasonings upon 
in mathematical inquiries. These principles are the laws and conditions of certain 
motions, and powers or forces, which chiefly have respect to philosophy; but, lest 
they should have appeared of themselves as dry and barren, I have illustrated them 
here and there with some philosophical scholiums, giving an account of such things 
                                                 
13 I. Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Praefatio ad Lectorem. 
14 It is true, though, that Petry did not explicitly trace back this metaphysical content to the application 
of mathematics. He writes: “Er [Newton] war [...] auch nicht bereit zuzugeben, daß seine eigenen 
Experimente, obwohl gründlich und streng durchdacht ausgeführt, nicht vollkommen ohne 
metaphysische Voraussetzungen auskommen können, und daß es für einen praktizierenden 
Naturwissenschaftler unmöglich ist, ohne Hypothesen zu arbeiten. [...] In dieser Hinsicht harmonieren 
ihre [Hegel’s and Goethe’s] Ideen viel besser mit modernen Auffassungen als das etwas 
positivistischere Ideal Newtons.” (M. J. Petry in: Hegel und die Naturwissenschaften, ed. M.J. Petry, 
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1987, p. 327). 
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as are of more general nature, and which philosophy seems chiefly to be founded 
on; such as the density and the resistance of bodies, spaces void of all bodies, and 
the motion of light and sounds. It remains that, from the same principles, I now 
demonstrate the frame of the System of the World.“15 
 
This passage is quite astonishing for the modern reader, since it reflects a quasi-
Cartesian understanding of mathematics which has been left behind at the latest in 
the 19th century. For Newton and his contemporaries, mathematics is by no means 
identical with what we call „pure“ mathematics.16 Newton considered equations 
describing the trajectories of particles in space as mathematical equations, not as 
elements of what we would call theoretical physics. It is evident that this is not only a 
terminological problem, since it is one of the basic features of the mechanistic 
wordview to be based upon an immediate (i.e. unreflected) application of 
mathematics to scientific inquiry.17 
It seems to me that Newton’s application of mathematics is indeed quite unreflected; 
that he finds it more or less self-evident that the phenomena described by the 
sciences have a mathematical structure.18 Thereby he leaves aside the question why 
quantitative categories of thought can be applied to the descripition of nature at all 
and which implications this description has. At the same time, what Newton calls 
„philosophy“ or „natural philosophy“ is supposed to be little more than applied 
mathematics – in order not to involve any hypotheses, if possible. I will come back to 
this point later when examining Hegel’s arguments in this regard. 
 
IIb. Hegel 
 
Hegel’s view on the relation between mathematics and physics is in extreme oppo-
sition to Newton’s. Hegel goes so far as to call the ambition to mathematically proove 
theorems of physics „ridiculous“. „The physical“ (Physisches) – says Hegel quite ra-
dically in his lecture on natural philosophy from 1823/24 – „cannot be proved 
                                                 
15 Sir Isaac Netwon’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World, 
Translated into English by Andrew Motte in 1729. Rev. By F. Cajori. Vol. Two: The System of the 
World. University of California Press, Berkeley-LosAngeles-London 1934, p. [397]. – Italics mine. 
16 It was C.F. Gauss who, at the beginning of the 19th century, laid stress on the importance and the 
development of „pure mathematics“. 
17 Cf. L. Fleischhacker, paper presented at the symposium „Zur Kritik des mechanistischen Weltbilds”, 
Berlin, Aug. 2004; to be edited by R. Wahsner. 
18 The concept of mass, even though introduced into physics by Newton is an interesting example in 
this regard. Newton seems to have missed the point that is was a nontrivial abstraction to define mass 
in the way he did (on the basis of an atomistic theory of matter). – Newton’s „direct”, unreflected 
application of mathematics in his physical investigations probably has its roots in Descartes; cf. e.g. E. 
Bloch, Das Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz, Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp 
Verlag) 1972, p.166: “[...] für Descartes fällt der physikalische Körper mit dem mathematischen 
zusammen.” 
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mathematically“.19 Similarly, he writes in the Logic of Measure that the attempt to 
proove natural laws mathematically “in the strict sense of the word, i.e. neither 
empirically nor conceptually, is absurd”.20 And in the – hitherto unpublished – 
manuscript by H.W. Dove, recording Hegel’s lecture from 1825/26, we find the 
phrase: „If nothing ought to be determined physically [as Newton pretends], then the 
term ‚force’ should be totally omitted.“21 It is true that the terms „physics”, „the 
physical” and „physically” are not exactly identical with their present-day 
counterparts. However, they do not refer to the second part of the natural philosophy 
either, since from a Hegelian standpoint it would be trivial to say that philosophical 
theorems cannot be proved mathematically. So we do have to assume that Hegel, 
when blaming Newton for pretending to have proved his physical theorems mathe-
matically, has an archetype of modern physics in mind, which exists in parallel to 
natural philosophy (see Enc. § 246); and we do have to ask: Which conception of the 
relation between physics and mathematics do the above cited sentences reflect? 
It is a conception which can be traced back to the time when Hegel lectured in Jena 
and published his Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets and the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. In his Dissertation from 1801, Hegel stresses the difference between the 
domain of mathematics and the domain of physics. He writes: „De qua [i.e. Newton’s] 
cum Mathesi Physices conjuctione praecipue monendum est, ut caveamus, ne 
rationes pure mathematicas cum rationibus physicis confundamus [...].”22 In other 
words, Hegel warns us from assigning any ontological value to mathematical 
concepts like vector components of the motion of a body, as was mentioned above 
already. – In the Foreword to the Phenomenology, where Newton is not mentioned 
explicitly, Hegel argues again that it is impossible to construct mathematical proofs of 
theorems of statics and mechanics like the laws of the lever or the law of free fall. 
Such proofs, says Hegel in 1807, do not proove any more than the necessity of real 
proofs.23 In other words, philosophy alone, provided that it makes use of the 
                                                 
19 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie Berlin 1823/24, Nachschrift von K.G.J v. Griesheim, 
Ed. G. Marmasse, Frankfurt a.M. et al. 2000, p. 144: „Man muß sich bei der ganzen Lehre nicht durch 
den Namen Newton bestechen lassen, in der Wissenschaft gilt kein Name, giebt es keine Autorität. 
Besonders lächerlich ist es wenn man sagt, er habe es mathematisch bewiesen. Phisisches kann 
nicht mathematisch bewiesen werden.“ This passage is within the discussion of Newton’s theory of 
colour. 
20 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, in: Werke in 20 Bden., ed. E. Moldenhauer and K.M. 
Michel, Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp Verlag) 1970, vol. 5, p. 407: „[...] daß der Versuch, solche 
Beweise eigentlich mathematisch, d.h. weder aus der Empirie noch aus dem Begriffe zu führen, ein 
widersinniges Unternehmen ist.“ – Italics mine. 
21 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie Berlin 1825/26, Nachschrift von H.W. Dove, Ed. Th. 
Posch et al., in preparation; manuscript, p. 45: „Wenn nichts physikalisch bestimmt werden soll, so 
wäre der Ausdruck ‚Kraft’ wegzulassen.“; cf. Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie Berlin 1821/22, 
Nachschrift von B.v.Uexküll, ed. G. Marmasse & Th. Posch, Frankfurt am Main 2002, p. 58: „Newton 
braucht den Namen Kräfte, ungeachtet seiner öfteren Protestationen, daß hiemit nur mathematische 
Bestimmungen gemeint seien.“ – VGL. AUCH JSE II. 
22 G.W.F. Hegel, Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum, ed. W. Neuser, Weinheim 1986, p. 82. 
23 G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, in: Werke in 20 Bänden, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K.M. 
Michel, Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp Verlag) 1970, vol. 3, p. 45: „Daß die sogenannten Beweise 
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dialectical method, can – in the strict sense of the word – proove the laws of the 
motion of natural bodies. The so-called proofs that applied mathematics – which 
Hegel rightly distinguishes from pure mathematics24 – is able to deliver do not grasp 
the genuine relation between the moments of natural laws – e.g. space and time – 
which is the essential content of these laws. Like pure mathematics, applied 
mathematics is unable to seize the qualitative, immanent, selfdetermined motion 
(Selbstbewegung) of the concept25 – a motion which includes non-quantitative 
transitions like that from the point to the line or the even more striking one from space 
to time. 
But what should the scientist do with natural laws, if not try to proove them in some 
sense? He must feel quite uncomfortable with Hegel’s distinction of “the empirical” 
(das Empirische) on the one hand and “the Notion”, that is to say the philosophical 
way of reasoning on the other hand.26 Given that the scientist is not a philosopher, 
should he pretend to derive natural laws merely from experimental research? 
A part of the answer to this question can be found in a footnote to § 267 of Hegel’s 
Encyclopaedia (3rd ed., 1830). In this footnote, Hegel comments on Lagrange’s 
remark on the relation of the Taylor series to the motion of point masses. He praises 
Lagrange for not pretending to proove the law of free fall by the expansion of such a 
series. Lagrange – says Hegel – rightly refrains from any alleged proof of this kind 
but restricts himself to adopting the acceleration term (a t²) from empirical research 
and comparing the mathematical (i.e. analytical) theory with it.27 A similar judgement 
can be found in Hegel’s treatise on the calculus in the first volume of his Science of 
                                                                                                                                                        
solcher Sätze, als der vom Gleichgewichte des Hebels, dem Verhältnisse des Raums und der Zeit in 
der Bewegung des Fallens usf., welche sie [die Mathematik] häufig gibt, für Beweise gegeben und 
angenommen werden, ist selbst nur ein Beweis, wie groß das Bedürfnis des Beweisens für das 
Erkennen ist, weil es, wo es nicht mehr hat, auch den leeren Schein desselben achtet und eine 
Zufriedenheit dadurch gewinnt.“ 
24 Pure mathematics, according to Hegel, does not use the concept of time. It deals exclusively with 
space (geometry) and with numbers (arithmetics, algebra): „Der Stoff, über den die Mathematik den 
erfreulichen Schatz von Wahrheiten gewährt, ist der Raum und das Eins.“ (Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, l.c., p. 44). 
25 Cf. ibid., p. 45: Mathematics does not get „zum Übergange des Entgegengesetzten in das 
Entgegengesetzte, nicht zur qualitativen, immanenten, nicht zur Selbstbewegung [of the concept].“ – 
See also the Logic of measure, l.c., p. 407: „Es muß aber noch ein höheres Beweisen dieser Gesetze 
gefordert werden, nämlich nichts anderes, als daß ihre Quantitätsbestimmungen aus den Qualitäten 
oder bestimmten Begriffen, die bezogen sind (wie Zeit und Raum), erkannt werden.“  
26 See above, note 20: Hegel finds it absurd to proove a law „neither empirically nor conceptually“ 
(„weder aus der Empirie noch aus dem Begriffe“). 
27 G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), in: Gesam-
melte Werke, in Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft hg. von der Rheinisch-
Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 20, Hamburg 1992, p. 263f: „Hier ist mit Recht 
keine Rede davon[,] einen Beweis von s = bt² aufstellen zu wollen, sondern diß Verhältniß wird als in 
der Natur sich findend aufgenommen.“ Hegel then speaks of Lagrange’s essentially „richtigen Gang, 
der diese Bestimmungen [i.e. the expansion of a Taylor series] nicht für einen Beweis des Gesetzes 
gebrauchen will, sondern dieses, wie hier gehörig, aus der Erfahrung aufnimmt und dann die 
mathematische Behandlung darauf anwendet.“ 
 9
Logic, even though this judgement is more focussed on the danger of assigning a 
physical meaning to the terms of the Taylor series.28  
From this praise for Lagrange, it can be concluded that Hegel, far from opposing the 
application of mathematics – more specifically: of analysis – to mechanics, did have a 
certain idea of this application. This idea can be characterized as follows: 
experimental physics should examine the motions (and other changes of state) of 
bodies under certain idealized conditions. Incidentally, Hegel does not stress the 
aspect of idealization very much, he rather stresses the necessity of making 
experiments without doing too much violence to nature (this is emphazised in the 
discussion of Newton’s theory of colour – see above). Now the motions thus 
examined by experimental physics should not be explained by any comprehensive 
theory; least of all should forces be introduced into the scientific description as 
explanatory principles, such that different phenomena would be derived from one 
basic set of concepts (e.g. space – time – mass – force or e.g. space – time – mass – 
energy). The latter task should be reserved to philosophy, since there is – according 
to Hegel – nothing between “the empirical” on the one hand and “philosophical 
theory” on the other hand. If it is not reserved to philosophy, and more specifically to 
a dialectical system of philosophy, some sort of a mechanistic worldview will 
inevitably result.  
To properly understand this position and its motivation, it is necessary to go into the 
architecture of the encyclopaedic system a little more deeply. 
 
 
III. The metaphysical background of Hegel’s view of the relation between ma-
thematics and physics  
 
It is difficult enough to understand what Hegel means when repeatedly claiming that 
theorems of physics cannot be proved mathematically. However, it is much more 
difficult to say what motivated this claim. At first glance, the assumption seems quite 
natural that Hegel simply perceived Newton’s use of mathematics as an epistemo-
logically naïve one. Even though I admit that this methodological criticism is a part of 
Hegel’s fundamental disapproval with Newton, I think that another point deserves our 
attention which is connected to the relation between physics and mathematics. This 
point is what I have elsewhere called Hegel’s anti-reductionism.29  
                                                 
28 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, in: Gesammelte Werke, l.c., vol. 21, p. 263: „Aber diese 
Gleichung [x = at + bt²] hat selbst nur diese Gestalt, durch die Voraussetzung der Erklärung, die den 
durch analytische Entwicklung entstehenden Gliedern gegeben wird, erhalten; diese Voraussetzung 
ist, daß die gleichförmig beschleunigte Bewegung zusammengesetzt sey, aus einer formell-gleich-
förmigen [...] und einem Zuwachse, (dem a in s = at² d.i. dem empirischen Coeffizienten), welcher der 
Kraft der Schwere zugeschrieben wird, – einem Unterschiede, der keineswegs in der Natur der Sache 
irgend eine Existenz oder Grund hat, sondern nur der fälschlich physikalisch gemachte Ausdruck 
[italics mine] dessen ist, was bey einer angenommenen analytischen Behandlung herauskommt.“ 
29 Cf. Th. Posch, Hegel’s Anti-Reductionism: Remarks on What is Living of his Philosophy of Nature, 
to be published in: Angelaki. Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. 2005. 
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What do I mean with anti-reductionism and how does it influence the conception of 
the relation between mathematics and physics? Evidently, it is necessary to define 
reductionism before defining anti-reductionism. As Hegel sees it, reductionism is a 
tendency of human understanding „to put everything on the same level”30 – such as 
on the level of mechanics or chemistry. It must be kept in mind that Hegel does not 
deny the possibility of applying mechanical models – or, in his terminology, the 
category of mechanism – even to subject matters of psychology.31 The conception of 
the Encyclopaedia even demands mechanism to realize itself in a logical, natural and 
spiritual (psychological) form. Hence, it would be a serious misunderstanding to 
conceive of Hegel’s anti-reductionism as a tendency to „forbid” the application of 
thought-categories to realms of reality which are apparently alien to these categories. 
On the contrary, it is the encyclopaedic system which makes it understandable why 
thought-categories designed to comprehend apparently „primitive” realms of reality 
can re-gain significance as moments – but just as moments! – of „higher” realms of 
reality. „Mechanical memory”, as Hegel put it, is a good example thereof. However, 
the encyclopaedic system still conserves an important feature of the concept of the 
„chain of beings”: It conserves the contention that philosophy should comprehend 
reality as having a hierarchical structure; that thought should not nivellate it, in spite 
of recognizing the usefullness of analogies and mechanical models. Anti-
reductionism, in this sense, can be defined as sticking to ontological hierarchies in a 
way that is compatible with Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysics.32 
It is beyond my scope to enter into a general discussion of how and to which degree 
post-Kantian philosophy can stick to ontological hierarchies. This would require a 
seperate study. I’d rather like to connect the so defined anti-reductionism to the 
relation between physics and mathematics. At first sight, there is little interrelation 
between both topics. Why should a given concept of applying mathematics in science 
result in a reductionist or anti-reductionist worldview? Indeed, there is no necessary 
connection between one and the other. However, coming back to the idea that any 
unreflected use of mathematics in science is likely to favour the mechanistic 
worldview – and having in mind that the latter is certainly a kind of reductionism – we 
                                                 
30 Cf. Hegel’s  Philosophy of Nature, ed. by M.J. Petry, 3 vols., London & New York (George Allen and 
Unwin) 1970, vol. 2, p. 43 (§ 286, Add.): „The attempt is made to put everything on the same level. 
Everything can of course be treated from a chemical point of view, but everything can also be treated 
from a mechanical point of view [...]. When bodies are treated at one stage, these does not exhaust 
the nature of other bodies however, as for example when vegetable or animal bodies are treated 
chemically.“ 
31 See e.g. G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Zweiter Band: Die subjektive Logik oder die Lehre 
vom Begriff, in: Gesammelte Werke, l. c., vol. 12, p. 133: „Wie der materielle Mechanismus, so besteht 
auch der geistige darin, daß die im Geiste bezogenen sich einander und ihm selbst äusserlich bleiben. 
Eine mechanische Vorstellungsweise, ein mechanisches Gedächtnis, die Gewohnheit, eine mecha-
nische Handlungsweise bedeuten, daß die eigenthümliche Durchdringung und Gegenwart des Gei-
stes bey demjenigen fehlt, was er auffaßt oder thut.“  
32 However, I would not call Kant himself an anti-reductionist. His thought is – so to speak – too much 
concentrated on his justified critique of ancient, naive ontology, that he is by and large unable to 
highlight the merits of ontological hierarchies like the concept of the chain of being. 
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may now ask to which extent Hegel’s opposition to Newton is ultimately motivated by 
the impression that the author of the Principia does unintentionally favour 
reductionism by his very understanding of „mathesim excolere, quatenus ea ad philo-
sophiam spectat”. 
Newton’s way of „mathesim excolere” depends on a new type of law that he intro-
duced to science, even though he did not formalize it in the way in which it has been 
formalized and vastly generalized in the 18th and 19th centuries: the dynamical law 
which has the structure of a differential equation. The law of universal gravitation is 
an example of such a law. To state it briefly (and explain it afterwards): Hegel’s idea 
of Newton’s being a reductionist is intimately connected to this new type of dynamical 
law. 
The dynamical law takes the place of the type of laws established by Kepler and 
Galileo – a type which is known to have been thoroughly analyzed by Hegel. I will 
henceforth call the laws of the Kepler-Galileo-type „phenomenological laws”, 
following Hegel’s crucial observation that Newton “set the laws of forces in the place 
of the laws of phenomena”.33  
The phenomenological laws are not entitled to be universal natural laws; rather, they 
refer to particular classes of phenomena which occur under certain circumstances, 
say, under terrestrial gravitation in vacuum, or under interplanetary conditions; 
furthermore in ideal gases etc. The dynamical laws, due to their formal structure, can 
describe motions or changes of state only after the specification of boundary 
conditions and after analytical or numerical integration. Phenomenological laws, too, 
can in many cases be derived from dynamical laws by the process of specifying 
boundary conditions and performing an integration. Galileo’s law, e.g., can be 
derived from Newton’s law of universal gravitation in such a way. Hence, even 
though not directly describing motions or changes of state, dynamical laws are in 
general considered as more fundamental than phenomenological laws. In this 
perspective, many phenomenological laws are considered as no more than rules for 
particular classes of motions governed by an underlying fundamental dynamical law.  
As mentioned above, Newton did not yet use the terms „dynamical laws”, „boundary 
conditions” etc. These terms as such are the result of a later formalization of New-
ton’s predominantly geometrical understanding of forces. However, the basic concept 
of dynamical laws, and of the dynameis (forces) governing them – and being the very 
scope of scientific research – can be found in Newton’s work.34 Therefore, my claim 
                                                 
33 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated from the German by E.S. Haldane 
and F.H. Simson, London (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.) 1895, vol. 3, p. 323. Cf. also 
B. Falkenburg, How to Save the Phenomena: Meaning and Reference in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Nature, in: Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature, ed. by St. Houlgate, New York (SUNY) 1998, p. 
97sqq. 
34 Cf. I. Newton, Principia, Foreword: „Alle Schwierigkeit der Philosophie besteht wohl darin, daß wir 
aus den Bewegungserscheinungen die Kräfte der Natur erschließen und alsdann von diesen Kräften 
ausgehend die übrigen Erscheinungen genau bestimmen. [...] Ich habe nämlich viele Gründe dafür 
jedenfalls zu vermuten, daß alles von bestimmten Kräften abhängen könnte, durch die die Teilchen 
der Körper aus noch nicht bekannten Ursachen entweder wechselseitig gegeneinander stoßen und in 
 12
that it is the introduction of dynamical laws which Hegel refuses to accept as a 
progress of science is by no means absurd. Quite the reverse, it can be shown that 
Hegel’s words on Newton’s alleged intermingling of mathematics and physics as well 
as his general anti-reductionism are related to what we might call apology of the phe-
nomenological against the dynamical law. 
Hegel’s well-known praise for Kepler as well as his praise for Lagrange implies that 
the author of the Encyclopaedia essentially would want the scientists to discover and 
deal with phenomenological laws of motions (and of changes of state), while he 
would not want them to construct whole theories deriving several classes of motions 
from unified dynamical laws. Hegel is convinced that only phenomenological laws like 
Kepler’s laws, Galileo’s law of free fall or Snell’s law of refraction can be integrated 
into a philosophical theory of natural phenomena that does really deserve this name. 
Unified dynamical laws, by contrast – like Newton’s law of universal gravitation 
(together with his axioms of mechanical motion) – appear to Hegel as a sort of a 
semi-philosophy which on the one hand has to use de facto metaphysical categories 
and on the other hand cannot justify the use of these categories nor construct a 
hierarchical system of them.35 
Hegel’s apology of the phenomenological law is furthermore related to his famous 
distinction between physics and natural philosophy as “thinking” and “comprehending 
consideration of nature” (“denkende” and “begreifende Naturbetrachtung”).36 This 
distinction is progressive compared to any sensualistic approach to physics which 
would deny even the status of “thinking consideration of nature”, insisting, e.g. on the 
idea that physics is just a method of economically dealing with perceptions.37 At the 
same time, Hegel’s distinction is problematic in reserving the status of “comprehen-
ding consideration of nature” to philosophy. Ultimately, this implies an unwillingness 
to concede the status of a theory (with its own epistemological status) to physics.  
In any case, stating that physics – and science in general – is not “comprehending 
consideration of nature” encourages Hegel to insist on the scientist’s task being the 
discovery and mathematical formulation of phenomenological laws. These laws are 
indeed not sufficient for the foundation of a theory of nature, for they do not relate 
different classes of motions, or, more generally speaking, different classes of 
phenomena, to each other: e.g. they do not relate magnetism to electricity or 
acoustical to mechanical phenomena, while dynamical laws aim precisely at that (e.g. 
Maxwell’s equations or the equations of wave mechanics). But now comes the point: 
The way in which dynamical laws relate apparently different realms of (phenomenal) 
reality to each other appears to Hegel as a dangereous mechanistic way. True, 
dynamical laws – suspects Hegel – would probably make it possible for physics to 
                                                                                                                                                        
regelmäßigen Strukturen zusammenhängen, oder sich wechselseitig fliehen und voneinander 
zurückweichen.“ 
35 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Enc. 1830, § 18. 
36 G.W.F. Hegel, Enc. 1830, § 246; according Petry’s translation, physics and philosophy are related to 
each other in the same way as „thinking consideration of nature“ and „comprehending consideration of 
nature“. 
37 Cf. Ernst Mach’s concept of science. 
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become a theory of nature on its own, but a reductionistic theory which does harm to 
the ambitions of philosophy. Phenomenological laws are not likely to do harm to a 
dialectical concept of nature, because they can be integrated into it as moments, 
thereby gaining their place in the hierarchy of an increasingly concrete “system of the 
real”. This is, in my reading, Hegel’s view of science as “cooperating with 
philosophy”.38  
It is possible to give a still preciser description of the kind of natural laws Hegel 
approves from a philosophical point of view and the kind of laws he disapproves. 
Hegel greatly appreciates power laws relating to each other what he would consider 
as phenomenological quantities (such as orbital periods and distances from the sun 
etc.). He is convinced that – at least in many important cases – it is possible to 
develop sort of an a priori deduction of such power laws from the concepts of the 
respective related entities, even though he admits that this is a most difficult task.39 
What Hegel disapproves of, on the other hand, are non-phenomenological natural 
laws, especially if they are supposed to establish a link between different branches of 
physics and if they accomplish this by highly abstract concepts such as force, energy, 
entropy, probability etc. True, most of these concepts have been introduced to 
science only after Hegel’s death; but Hegel’s resistance to this type of concepts is 
evident enough from the way in which he treats atomism and Newton’s concept of 
force. 
An interesting example to illustrate this point is the principle of conservation of 
energy. It seems to be misleading in the present context insofar as it is neither a 
principle established by Newton nor a dynamical law in the strict sense of the word, 
since it is not formulated as a differential equation and does not refer to forces, but to 
energies. However, it must be noted that the energetic approach is equivalent to the 
Newtonian approach of founding mechanics upon the concept of force40; the ener-
getic approach is, technically speaking, an integrated version of the dynamical 
approach.  
Now there is little doubt that Hegel would have critizised the principle of conservation 
of energy in a very similar way as he critizised Newton’s law of gravitation. Like the 
latter, the energy conservation principle represents a partial unification of hitherto 
distinct theories like mechanics and thermodynamics. Insofar as it is formulated in 
sentences like “heat is a kind of mechanical energy”41, this principle threatens to 
nivellate the difference between mechanical motions and phenomena related to 
heat.42 I do not claim that any way to state – and any effort to interpret – the energy 
                                                 
38 Cf. Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, ed. and trans. by M. J. Petry, loc. cit., vol. 1, p. 201: „Physics must 
[...] work together with philosophy ao that the universalized understanding which it provides may be 
translated into the Notion.“ 
39 W 5, 407 (already cited). 
40 Cf. H. Hertz, Hertz Die Prinzipien der Mechanik in neuem Zusammenhange dargestellt, Leipzig 
1894. 
41 This was the version of the energy conservation principle which Robert Mayer had in 1842. 
42 NB: In his Jenaer Systementwürfe, Hegel uses himself terms which he borrows from mechanics 
(like lever, throw etc.) for the description of phenomena related to heat. 
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conservation principle will necessarily reduce the essence of heat to the essence of 
mechanical motion; such a claim would be a as naïve as certain uncritical attempts to 
understand the concept of energy as the basis of physics par excellence. What I 
claim is that we can better understand Hegel’s view of natural laws by hypothetically 
constructing his assessment of the law of energy conservation. So, once again, a 
Hegelian assessment of the energy conservation principle would – very much like the 
Hegelian assessment of Newton’s law of gravitation – not involve the statement that 
the concept of energy is totally useless in physics. To the contrary, Hegel would find 
it highly significant, for example, that the radiation energy emitted by a star can be 
related by a power law to its surface temperature (if the star is considered as 
representing the case of a blackbody). He would try to find a reason immanent in the 
very concept of temperature which makes this law (the Stefan-Boltzmann law) 
understandable from a philosophical point of view, especially with respect to the 
occurence of the fourth power, which is, by the way, rather rare in natural laws. At the 
same time, Hegel would say that it is problematic to set up equations relating 
different kinds of energy to each other, following the principle of understanding, which 
is looking for quantitative identity (“das Verstandesdenken, welches an der Linie der 
Gleichheit fortgeht”). In this perceptive, the energy conservation principle, too, entails 
the danger of overlooking essential differences between the kinds of energy which it 
equates numerically.  
The general rule behind this hypothetical assessment of energy conservation is the 
following. Not only Newton is of the opinion that physics should beware from 
metaphysics, but Hegel is of this opinion as well; just that his he defines the use of 
metaphysics in physics quite differently. While in Newton’s view, the introduction of 
the concept of force helps physics to surmount the status of a scholastic doctrine, 
Hegel holds that forces, energies and other highly abstract concepts of physics, if 
used for a unification of natural laws without the guidance of philosophy, accidentally 
render science a new variety of metaphysics. 
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
Does the reconstruction of the metaphysical background of Hegel’s criticism of New-
ton’s method render the former, in its basic structure, fully justified? I would say: Yes 
and no. Let me begin with the “yes”-part of this answer. 
Hegel’s criticism of the type of natural laws introduced by Newton has several merits. 
First of all, by praising Kepler and chastizing Newton, Hegel proposes to make a fun-
damental difference between what he considers as phenomenological laws on the 
one hand and dynamical laws on the other hand. Second, he rightly points out that 
the establishment of dynamical laws is more than a self-evident application of 
mathematical equations to physics. In this sense, he shows that Newton has maybe 
a somewhat naïve concept of the relation between mathematics and physics. Third, 
Hegel reminds us of the fact – or rather, he foresees – that scientific theories, based 
upon the unification of dynamical laws, may abet the mechanistic worldview if 
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uncritically understood as “theories of everything”.43 In other words, Hegel’s criticism 
of Newton’s aiming at unified dynamical laws is fully justified if re-interpreted as a 
criticism of the harm which the mechanistic worldview can do to philosophy.44 
This point, however, leads me to the shortcomings of Hegel’s anti-Newtonian attitude. 
It can be considered as a widely accepted result of the research on Newton and 
Hegel that Newtonianism and the mechanistic worldview are not exactly one and the 
same thing.45 If this is true, then Hegel, by identifying both, has partly failed to 
correctly assess Newton’s achievements; and insofar as the latter laid the foundation 
of modern physics, Hegel has also failed to correctly situate physics from an 
epistemological point of view. In this regard, I would say that it might have been an 
option 200 years ago to restrict physics to the quest for phenomenological laws and 
to state that natural philosophy alone will be able to construct a comprehensive 
theory of nature based on the selfdetermination of the Notion (as Hegels puts it); 
however, the development of physics in the 19th century forces us to conceive the 
relation between physics and philosophy in a different way. The starting point of this 
way should be the recognition of physics (as well as chemistry etc.) as a seperate 
theory of nature; in other words, the recognition that science does not need to wait 
for a philosophical interpretation in order to become something more complex and 
more consistent than what Hegel calls “the empirical”. 
This does not mean, however, that a philosophical interpretation of scientific theories 
be superfluous; it rather means that it has to be an interpretation of scientific theories 
in the strict sense of the word, not an interpretation of isolated laws and phenomena. 
Today as well as at Hegel’s time, it does make sense to give a philosophical answer 
to the question for the difference between the chemical and the mechanical object; 
while it probably makes less sense to “proove” laws of mechanical motion (or 
chemical interaction) in a philosophical manner. It does make sense to ask how the 
status of objectivity has changed with the transition from classical to quantum 
mechanics, while it would be short-sighted to aim at an a priori deduction of Heisen-
berg’s uncertainity principle. Hegel’s philosophy of nature – even though avoiding 
isolated, allegedly philosophical considerations of natural phenomena in its best parts 
– is not free of the temptation of philosophizing about individual scientific theorems 
and equations. It is true that Hegel makes plenty of astonishing and elucidating 
observations when philosophizing about Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws; however, it is 
doubtful whether he thereby gives a good example to his followers from a 
methodological point of view. 
All these ideas can probably be summarized in the following sentence: Hegel’s 
justified insistence on qualitative differences within the realm of nature is not – 
contrary to his own conviction – necessarily coupled to the refutation of the 
Newtonian quest for unified dynamical laws, even though the latter seem to 
automatically endanger the former at first sight. 
                                                 
43 More details on this point can be found in Th. Posch, Hegel’s Anti-Reductionism: Remarks on What 
is Living of his Philosophy of Nature, loc. cit. 
44 Cf. Wahsner, The Phil. Background to Hegel’s Criticism of Newton’s Mechanics, in Petry 1993.   
45 Cf. Wahsner / v. Borzeszkowski, Newton und Voltaire. 
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It is certainly true, however, that unified dynamical laws are much more difficult to 
integrate into a philosophy of nature of the Hegelian type. The reason for this is that 
the philosopher, in contemplating these laws, can by no means rely on his “sense of 
nature”, but has to analyze the epistemological status of the scientific disciplines that 
have worked out the respective laws, the formal structure of them, and their 
phenomenal content, until eventually arriving at a refined concept of nature as a 
“system of stages” – stages, about which the scientist may say in the end: “Isn’t it all 
the same anyway?” 
